Trump’s exploratory outreach to Iran, presented as a clean slate, stands in stark contrast to the turbulence of his hawkish first term. Is this a sincere effort at diplomacy or a calculated salvo to throw his opponents off guard?
In a surprising reversal, US President Donald Trump, who previously ordered the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and unilaterally withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has signaled a willingness to reengage with Iran.
His actions during his first term significantly destabilized West Asia, maximized tensions between Washington and Tehran – further entrenching a legacy of mistrust – ignited proxy conflicts, and complicated US relations with its allies.
Yet, despite these past moves – or perhaps because of them –Trump now appears intent on resetting relations with Iran, signaling a fresh start with no threats or preconditions.
This, together with his dismissal of US Special Envoy for Iran Brian Hook, an enforcer of “maximum pressure” sanctions, terminations of security clearances for anti-Iran policymakers who led him astray in his first term, and his appointment of Michael DiMino, a realist on Iran policy, are positive signs.
Interpreting the signals
Deciphering Trump’s latest overtures is no easy task, given his volatile nature, the conflicting array of signals coming from Washington, and the political storm surrounding his actions.
The Tehran Times classifies the conflicting forces into two camps: “War Hawks” and “America First.” Trying to interpret Trump’s intent feels as uncertain as scapulimancy – reading omens in animal bones – amid the noise of his presidency.
Some suspect the signals about negotiations, reported by an Israeli newspaper, may serve strategic goals far removed from diplomacy.
For instance, they may be a stalling tactic for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to negotiate prisoner releases or for an exhausted occupation army to regroup before any action against Iranian nuclear facilities.
For all we know, Trump’s administration may plan to use the delay to cement critical appointmentsor prepare the US military to back Israeli operations.
The US president’s many marital infidelities, bankruptcies, breaches of business agreements, and unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, make him, ipso facto, a faithless man and dubious negotiating partner.
For Tehran to consider engagement, Trump must offer a genuine gesture of good faith, such as lifting sanctions on Iranian oil or reconnecting Iranian banks to SWIFT. While codifying sanctions relief through Congress would be ideal, it is highly unlikely.
The Islamic Republic’s view
Meanwhile, the administration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has made no secret of its openness to negotiations, with Reformist factions actively advocating for dialogue. Former foreign minister and current Vice-President for Strategic Affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif, a favorite in Washington, recently appealed to Trump to restart nuclear talks.
However, this eagerness only undermines Tehran’s bargaining position, as Trump’s predatory instincts are quick to exploit desperation. The Reformist approach in 2015, which handed former US president Barack Obama and Netanyahu extensive leverage without securing adequate benefits, serves as a bitter reminder of the risks.
The firing of Brian Hook, too, is open to interpretation – as are the punitive measures against hawks John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, and 50 former senior intelligence and military officials, which can be explained away by the political adage, “reward your friends, punish your enemies.”
Trump’s appointment of Michael DiMino as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East caused excitement in America First circles, and hysteria in Israel First circles. DiMino has expressed rational views vis-à-vis West Asia. One of his main “heresies” is that the region does “not really” matter for US interests.
Does the ‘Middle East’ matter?
Even a cursory examination of DiMino’s observation reveals its truth. North America (US and Canada) has abundant oil and gas reserves for domestic consumption. The US does not need to import one drop of crude oil or one cubic millimeter of natural gas – if “green energy” and “climate change” restrictions are eliminated – hence, Trump’s pledge to “drill, baby, drill,” and abandon the Paris climate accords.
The US is a net exporter of oil and gas. To illustrate, in the aftermath of the Biden Administration’s act of state terrorism against the Russian Federation on 26 September 2022, via the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, the US began supplying the EU with liquefied natural gas (LNG,) accounting for 50 percent of Europe’s 2023 imports. West Asian oil and gas are not imperatives for North America.
US military bases in West Asia exist principally to protect Israel. Bases in Incirlik and Izmir in Turkiye reflect NATO commitments. Qatar’s Al-Udayd base expanded in 2001; Al-Dhafra, UAE, was developed in 2002; the seaport in Bahrain in 2003, the air base in 2009; and Prince Sultan Air Base and smaller bases in Saudi Arabia were expanded.
This expansion was for the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) and to “contain” Iran. However, despite the end of GWOT in 2021, the bases still thrive.
Kuwait lost about ten bases from its Iraq War peak, but around 14,000 US personnel remain at Camp Arifjan, Ali al-Salem Air Base, and four other bases. Illegal US occupation outposts in Syria and their unwelcome presence in Iraq exist solely to “contain” Iran.
Who pays for these bases? Not Israel. Which country’s troops are in danger in Syria, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE? Not Israel. Who benefits? Certainly not the US.
Political and military factors that may influence Trump
Iran’s recent demonstrations of military capability complicate any plans for military action. During Operations True Promise I and II, its ballistic missile program has proven capable of penetrating Israeli defenses, and its advanced air defense systems thwarted an October 2024 Israeli attack.
While propaganda might suggest otherwise – that Israel “derided Iran’s missiles as ‘crude’ despite the fact that the projectiles penetrated Israel’s air defense en masse and struck sensitive targets” – Iran’s ability to mount a devastating response to aggression remains clear.
DiMino was criticized for saying that Iran’s attack was “fairly moderate,” but former intelligence analyst Lee Slusher, concurs:
“[T]hat Iran did not execute a wide-ranging, catastrophic assault was wrongly interpreted as a lack of ability instead of as a sign of restraint. Iran responded to Israel’s provocations by messaging that it did not want a wider war and, critically, by previewing some of its high-end offensive capabilities.”
Simultaneously, Israel’s global reputation has suffered as Americans – both liberal and conservative – grow weary of US involvement in West Asia.
Making America trustworthy again
Public sentiment against foreign entanglements extends to the financial and military support for Ukraine and Israel, which many Americans view as burdens on US resources. Trump’s base, in particular, has little patience for the “forever wars” in the region.
If Trump is serious about negotiating with Iran, he must first rebuild trust through unilateral concessions. For Tehran, this could include rolling back sanctions or reconnecting to global financial systems. Without such gestures, skepticism will persist on both sides.
Ultimately, Trump may find that engaging in diplomacy, rather than another war, is the only viable path forward. Whether his actions will reflect this realization remains to be seen.
If Trump listens to Americans and receives sound advice on Iran’s missile capabilities and air defenses, he will find it expedient to negotiate and avoid a war that the US will eventually lose in a long and costly conflict.
Published by The Cradle
Republished by The 21st Century
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 21cir.com